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Introduction
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence . . . . 2

One evening, you are on your way home from work. You make
your normal drive from your office to your house without any stops.
A few days later, you receive a certified letter from the local police
department informing you that you are a “person of interest” in a
homicide investigation. The police request you to come to the
station to be interviewed. The letter explains that law enforcement
obtained your cell phone’s site location information (CSLI) 3 from
your cellular provider. Using your CSLI, as well as CSLI from
other “persons of interest,” your phone’s data shows that you were
in the vicinity of the homicide at the time it occurred. 4 The letter
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
3. See Case Comment, United States v. Graham: Fourth Circuit Holds That
Acquisition of Historical Cell-Site Location Information Is Not a Search, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2017) [hereinafter Acquisition] (explaining that CSLI
is “a carrier’s records of the cell tower used to route a user’s calls and messages”
usually to the closest tower (citing United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343
(4th Cir. 2015))); see also Alexander Porter, “Time Works Changes”: Modernizing
Fourth Amendment Law To Protect Cell Site Location Information, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1781, 1798 (2016) (“Historical CSLI is data that the cellular service provider
creates and keeps about the communication between an individual cell phone and
the cellular network.” (citing Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New
Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location
Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 574–75 (2012))).
4. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (explaining that law
enforcement can use CSLI to “reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to
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also claims that by signing up and using your cell phone provider’s
service, you voluntarily consented to your provider releasing your
cell phone tracking information to law enforcement. The police
have conducted warrantless surveillance with no reasonable cause.
The hypothetical above should frighten every smartphone
user in the United States. It is estimated that in 2017, there are
approximately 224,300,000 people using smartphones in the
United States. 5 Given the current state of technology and the law,
the hypothetical could become a reality. Advances in technology
allow smartphone location data to be determined more precisely. 6
Smartphones hold increasingly personalized and revealing
information about their owners. 7 Law enforcement also has access
to increasingly sophisticated methods to acquire CSLI. 8
Meanwhile, the law has not kept up with technology or society’s

the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building” with
increasing accuracy (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring))).
5. See Number of smartphone users in the United States from 2010 to 2022
(in millions), STATISTA (2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182/forecast
-of-smartphone-users-in-the-us/ (displaying the number of smartphone users in
the United States from data gathered between 2010 and 2016 and projecting that
consumer smartphone use in the United States will continue to increase) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[M]any of the more than 90% of American adults who
own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of
their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.” (citing City of Ontario v. Quon,
560 U. S. 746, 760 (2010))); see also Jacob Poushter, Smartphone Ownership and
Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb.
22, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-andinternet-usage-continues-to-in-emerging-economies/ (stating that 2015 research
indicates 72% of people over eighteen years of age in the United States own a
smartphone) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
6. See Craig Silliman, Technology and Shifting Privacy Expectations
(Perspective), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/technology-andshifting-privacy-expectations-perspective/ (“[C]hanges—particularly, the surge in
our customers’ use of data and the fact that many of today’s cell sites have smaller
ranges—mean that our network now collects more voluminous and more precise
location information . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
7. See id. (explaining how the current technological capabilities of everyday
technology such as a cell phone create Fourth Amendment concerns).
8. See id. (describing the process used by wireless networks to capture
CSLI).
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reasonable expectations of privacy. 9 The legal standards for the
government to obtain cell phone tracking data are inconsistent and
often unclear. 10 The ability of law enforcement agencies to obtain
this type of personal information often without a warrant impacts
all smartphone users and raises serious Fourth Amendment
privacy concerns. 11
In some jurisdictions, real-time tracking of a cell phone’s
location does require a warrant. 12 As of February of 2017, however,
several federal circuit courts have held that law enforcement may
routinely obtain CSLI without a probable cause warrant. 13 The
9. See id. (suggesting that U.S. Supreme Court precedent from the 1970s
may not be applicable today “when [a customer] reveal[s] location information to
[the] carrier simply because [the] device is connected to its network”).
10. See id. (noting that while some jurisdictions require law enforcement to
obtain historical location information through a probable cause warrant, which
imposes a significant burden on the government, “[m]ost courts have held that a
court order is sufficient”).
11. See id. (describing how courts struggle when applying the third-party
doctrine to advancing technology).
12. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still
Doesn’t Require a Warrant, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csli-warrant/47
8197/ (discussing different warrant requirements between real-time CSLI and
historic CSLI) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (2015) (enacted as a companion
statute to the Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (1986) and
requiring the government to obtain real-time CSLI).
13. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1782 (explaining that “[f]ive Federal Courts
of Appeals covering more than 155 million Americans have approved the
acquisition of historical CSLI by law enforcement” on less than probable cause,
using instead a “specific and articulable facts standard”). However, many scholars
argue that for cases involving historical CSLI, the government should be required
to meet a higher standard that requires a probable cause warrant. See Brian L.
Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell
Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 37–38 (2013)
(referencing court opinions that support the application of a probable cause
standard due to the breadth and intrusiveness of electronic surveillance using
cell-site-location records); see also Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered
Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a
Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2009) (arguing
that a probable cause standard should govern disclosure of historical CSLI, and
not “some lesser standard,” because it will likely be obtained more frequently by
federal agents than real-time CSLI); see also Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location
Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV.
681, 742–43 (2011) (stating that “acquisition [of historical CSLI] by law
enforcement should proceed only after agents obtain a warrant based on probable
cause” because “its acquisition implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
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legal doctrine used to justify these warrantless searches is known
as the “third-party doctrine.” 14
Like our hypothetical, the third-party doctrine justifies
warrantless searches of a consumer’s historical CSLI under the
theory that the consumer has “voluntarily” given consent to his
carrier to disclose cell phone tracking information to third
parties. 15 The logic behind the doctrine is that since the consumer
has consented in the agreement with the provider, the consumer
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy of the CSLI regardless
how much or what type of information is revealed. 16 The doctrine
was first established in the 1970’s when particular technology
involving the spread of consumer-based microprocessors and
sensors was much less ubiquitous than it is in 2017. 17 As a result,
consumers’ expectations of privacy have likely changed
dramatically. 18 Therefore, the third-party doctrine “does not
accurately estimate what society today would consider
reasonable.” 19
Courts have struggled to apply this dated and static doctrine
in a world of ever-changing technology. 20 This struggle will only
become more difficult as technology continues to evolve. 21 Several
14. See Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth
Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 511 (2016) (describing
the Fourth Amendment roots of the third-party doctrine and the problems this
doctrine creates as technology evolves).
15. See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth
Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 489, 506 (2012) (discussing how the element of voluntary disclosure in the
third-party doctrine precludes a court from characterizing the government’s
acquisition of such disclosed information as a “search”).
16. See Silliman, supra note 6 (stating that new technology may change
society’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
17. See David Oscar Markus & Nathan Freed Wessler, That ‘70s Show: Why
the 11th Circuit Was Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone
Tracking Case, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2016) (discussing how courts
should not apply old privacy doctrines to modern technology).
18. See id. at 1205 (“Recent data shows that more than 80 percent of people
consider ‘[d]etails of [their] physical location over time’ to be ‘sensitive’--evincing
greater concern for this data . . . .”).
19. Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1273.
20. See Silliman, supra note 6 (explaining that courts are struggling to apply
static law to rapidly advancing technology in Fourth Amendment cases).
21. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1193–94 (2016) (analyzing how
courts rely on old pre-digital precedent to reach different conclusions).
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recent United States Supreme Court cases suggest that the thirdparty doctrine should be modernized. 22 Questions remain about
how the doctrine should be updated and whether the courts or the
legislature should decide this issue.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I describes the birth
and evolution of the third-party doctrine including informants,
controversial pen registers, and the current complexity of locationbased tracking technology. Part II examines the current conflict
between courts’ application of the third-party doctrine and citizens’
reasonable expectations of privacy. Finally, Part III considers
possible solutions to the third-party doctrine quagmire.
Ultimately, this Note proposes that the current third-party
doctrine should be interpreted to require the government to obtain
a probable cause warrant to collect real-time and historical CSLI.
I. The Evolution of the Third-Party Doctrine: From Informants to
Modern Cell Phone Tracking
In 1942, United States Supreme Court Justice Murphy opined
that “science has brought forth far more effective devices for the
invasion of a person’s privacy than the direct and obvious methods
of oppression which were detested by our forebears . . . .” 23 A brief
history of Fourth Amendment protections involving advancing
technology is essential to understand the current state of the thirdparty doctrine.

22. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.
concurring) (“[The third-party doctrine] is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching [information on] a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple—get a warrant.”); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437
(4th Cir. 2016) (“A per se rule that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties seems unmoored from current
understandings of privacy.”).
23. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
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A. Fourth Amendment Protections
1. Wiretapping

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. 24

Since 1877, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
this protection and has applied it to privacy matters. 25 The notion
of privacy has evolved considerably since 1877. As Michael Price
explains, the Supreme Court “could afford to be technology-blind” 26
until 1928 when it heard the case of Olmstead v. United States. 27
In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft explained that in attempting to
gather evidence of a conspiracy, law enforcement inserted wires in
telephone lines “without trespass[ing] upon any property of the
defendants.” 28 Collecting evidence through these wiretaps
“continued for many months.” 29
Analyzing wiretapping in the light of Fourth Amendment
privacy concerns, the Court explained that Fourth Amendment
protections are only implicated by an “official search and seizure
of his [a defendant’s] person, or such a seizure of his papers or his
24. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
25. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy rights by requiring a warrant to open letters and
sealed postal packages); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967)
(stating that the Constitution protects a citizen’s reasonable expectation of
privacy).
26. See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers”
and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 259 (2016)
(detailing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fourth Amendment
privacy cases).
27. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that
wiretapping “did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment”).
28. See id. at 457 (describing how federal prohibition officers seized
information about the defendants’ conspiracy “by intercepting messages on the
telephones of the conspirators” without physically invading their property).
29. Id.
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tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his
house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.” 30 Under
the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court held that
warrantless wiretapping was constitutional. 31
Price explains that because the Court in Olmstead relied on
property law, it did not focus on the role technology played in
society. 32 Illustrating Price’s criticism, Justice Taft stated that in
the context of wiretapping, “intervening wires are not part of his
house or office any more than they are the highways along which
they are stretched.” 33 Notably, Justice Brandeis offered a dissent
stating:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home. 34

Extending its reasoning from Olmstead, the Court held in the
1942 case of United States v. Goldman 35 that federal agents using
a “detectaphone” placed on the side of a wall to hear and
transcribe a conversation between defendants was “not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 36
Both Olmsted and Goldman “were products of the Court’s
failure to give weight to new technology and the way it functions
in society.” 37 Even with the spread of and reliance on technology in
society, the Supreme Court continued to emphasize that the
30. See id. at 467 (explaining the circumstances necessary to invoke the
protections offered by the Fourth Amendment).
31. See id. at 466 (determining that the government’s wiretapping did not
give rise to Fourth Amendment protections for the defendants).
32. See Price, supra note 26, at 267 (examining how the Supreme Court
initially analyzed Fourth Amendment concerns about new technology in society).
33. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
34. Id. at 474.
35. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
36. See id. at 131 (explaining that a detectaphone is a “listening apparatus”
with earphones that allow law enforcement officers to hear the defendant through
the wall).
37. Price, supra note 26, at 260.
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Fourth Amendment’s protection extends primarily to physical
trespasses. 38 While the development of privacy protections under
the Fourth Amendment continued, the Court was slow to depart
from this trespass analysis. 39
2. Informants and “False Friends”
In addition to analyzing Fourth Amendment cases through the
lens of a physical trespass requirement, the Court also emphasized
that generally, information revealed to third parties lacked
sufficient Fourth Amendment protections. 40 In the 1952 case, On
Lee v. United States, 41 the Court famously allowed law
enforcement to submit evidence obtained from “informers,
accessories, accomplices, [and] false friends” without violating the
Fourth Amendment. 42 The Court explained that a defendant may
still be implicated in a crime when she discusses her involvement
in or knowledge of criminal activity with a government
informant. 43 The fact that the defendant does not know the identity
of the informant does not shield the defendant from liability. 44
38. See id. (noting that following Goldman in 1942, the Supreme Court did
not make a “shift away from the traditional concepts of property and trespass that
had long dominated its jurisprudence” until 1967, when the Court “declar[ed] that
the Fourth Amendment ‘protects people, not places’” (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))).
39. See Ryan Merkel, Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law
Enforcement’s Use of Historical and Real Time Mobile Device Data, 35 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 429, 439–40 (noting the Supreme Court’s discussion of the trespass
doctrine in recent location tracking technology cases).
40. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 506–11 (discussing the Fourth
Amendment search cases that helped establish the third-party doctrine).
41. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (finding no
violation of the Fourth Amendment where an undercover federal agent entered
the defendant’s place of business with consent and used a radio to transmit selfincriminating statements made by the defendant to another federal agent who
was stationed outside the defendant’s place of business).
42. See id. at 757 (“We cannot say that testimony such as this shall, as a
matter of law, be refused all hearing.”).
43. See id. at 757–58 (stating that the informant’s credibility may be
attacked in court, but the court should admit evidence of the defendant’s
conversation with the informant).
44. See id. (suggesting that courts should not exclude testimony of
“informers” or “false friends”).
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To do otherwise would “arbitrarily” penalize the government’s
case, because of the “low morals of its informers.” 45 Continuing its
analysis, the Court explained that while an informant’s credibility
may be attacked and questioned in court, evidence obtained from
an informant should not be excluded. 46 The On Lee Court further
reasoned that revealing information to individuals contains a risk
that the receiver of the information may go to the police. 47
3. Katz and the Legal Framework for the Third-Party Doctrine
As the Court continued to use the 1952 reasoning of On Lee to
justify informant evidence, technology continued to advance.
Finally, in 1967, the Court appeared to embrace Justice Brandeis’s
Olmstead dissent. 48 In the case of Katz v. United States, 49 the Court
departed from the traditional application of the Fourth
Amendment search analysis which had focused on the notion of
physical trespass. Katz helped established the framework for the
third-party doctrine. 50 The Court seemed to acknowledge emerging
technology and society’s expectation of privacy. 51
In Katz, 52 the defendant was convicted of transmitting
“wagering information” over a telephone from Los Angeles to

45. Id.
46. See id. (asserting that the testimony of government informants should
be challenged using the traditional evidentiary canons such as relevance and
credibility and should not be automatically excluded from trial).
47. See Price, supra note 26, at 266–67 (explaining how courts use
assumption of the risk analysis in Fourth Amendment privacy cases).
48. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen.”).
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (shifting from the
traditional Fourth Amendment search analysis which had focused on physical
trespass).
50. See id. at 353 (refusing to follow previous precedent which emphasized
physical trespass to establish Fourth Amendment protections).
51. See id. (concluding that “[t]he [g]overnment’s activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth”).
52. Id.
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Miami and Boston. 53 Katz argued that the government violated his
Fourth Amendment protections because FBI agents “attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he [Katz] had placed his calls” to
conduct his wagering business. 54 Initially, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit continued the traditional analytical framework
by emphasizing that there should be a trespass and physical
seizure before recognizing a Fourth Amendment violation. 55 As a
result, the Court of Appeals affirmed Katz’s conviction and stated
that his Constitutional protections were not violated. 56
On appeal, the Supreme Court modified its traditional Fourth
Amendment analytical emphasis on whether there was a physical
trespass. 57 Instead, the Court acknowledged that:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 58

Reversing Katz’s conviction, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the Constitution protects “people, not places.” 59 The Court stated
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a “technical trespass
under . . . property law” before a Constitutional protection can be
violated. 60 Distinguishing Olmstead, which relied on the need for
a physical trespass and seizure of material before Fourth
Amendment protections were violated, the Court stated that “we
have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision
53. Id. at 348.
54. Id.
55. See id. (using precedent based on property law to determine if there was
a Fourth Amendment violation).
56. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134–35 (9th Cir. 1966)
(affirming defendant’s conviction primarily because there was no “physical
entrance into the area occupied” by the defendant).
57. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (refusing to follow
previous precedent which emphasized physical trespass to establish Fourth
Amendment protections).
58. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210
(1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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[Olmstead] rested.” 61 As a result, the Court altered its previous
jurisprudential reliance on trespass law and held that the Fourth
Amendment privacy protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures applied in a case involving the use of a telephone
booth. 62
As Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion, a question
remained: if the Constitution protects people and not physical
places, how will the Court analyze this protection? 63 Justice
Harlan outlined what became known as the Katz two-prong
privacy test: first, whether “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” 64 Under the Katz test, Justice Harlan stated that the
defendant had a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy” inside the telephone booth, and law enforcement
violated this expectation. 65
4. Bank Records in United States v. Miller and Pen Registers in
Smith v. Maryland
After Justice Harlan’s Katz test, the Supreme Court
considered two cases in the 1970’s that were essential to
establishing the third-party doctrine. 66 In 1976, the Supreme
Court examined how the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections
applied to a customer’s bank deposit slips, checks, and financial
records in the case of United States v. Miller. 67 While Miller
61. Id. at 353.
62. See id. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he
will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
63. See id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts may
need more of a clear standard to analyze Fourth Amendment claims with new
technology).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 360–61.
66. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1180–81 (explaining that the
modern-day test courts use to evaluate Fourth Amendment privacy claims was
created primarily in the 1970’s).
67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–38 (1976) (explaining that
the bank ordering employees to make defendant’s bank records available to police
did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation).
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claimed that he disclosed the bank records to his bank “for a
limited purpose” and therefore he retained an expectation of
privacy under the first prong of the Katz test, the Court rejected
his assertion. 68 Instead, the Court stated that “[w]e must examine
the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in
order to determine whether there is a legitimate ‘expectation of
privacy’ concerning their contents.” 69
Examining Miller’s deposit slips, checks, and financial
documents, the Court concluded that there was “no legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’” because all the documents were either “not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions” or “contain[ed] only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks” in the ordinary course of
business. 70
Interestingly, some scholars suggest that the nature of the
documents played a role in the Court’s analysis, 71 as follows:
The Court found it significant that the documents in question
were not sensitive in nature or shared with the intent that they
stay private; rather, they were commercial instruments any
employee could see. That, rather than their third-party nature,
was why Miller—and by extension society—could not
legitimately expect privacy in them. 72

Furthermore, the Court explained that “[t]he depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will
be conveyed by that person to the Government.” 73

68. See id. at 442–43 (stating that Court has examined the nature of the
documents and acknowledged that the depositor assumes the risk that this
information may be revealed to police).
69. See id. at 442 (affirming the defendant’s conviction by using information
about the defendant that the police obtained from the bank (citing Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973))).
70. Id.
71. See Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1277; see generally Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183,
1230–31 (2016) (discussing the modern version of this analysis and the
interaction between informational fiduciaries and the Fourth Amendment).
72. Id. at 1277.
73. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 443 (1976) (citing United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)).
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Not all the Justices in Miller agreed. 74 Foreshadowing the
same issue that would arise when modern-day consumers sign up
for cell phone service, Justice Brennan noted that the disclosure of
information to a bank is “not entirely volitional, since it is
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary
society without maintaining a bank account.” 75 Critically, he
warned that the majority’s reasoning and decision to allow third
parties access to a citizen’s sensitive and personal information
without a search warrant may create serious Fourth Amendment
concerns. 76 As Justice Brennan noted:
To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon
his request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other
traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the
evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution
against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited
range of very real abuses of police power. 77

Three years after Miller, the Supreme Court examined
whether law enforcement violated a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment protections by installing, without a warrant, a “pen
register” 78 at a telephone company to determine which numbers a
defendant was dialing from his private telephone line. 79 In Smith
v. Maryland 80 the Court concluded that “no warrant was
required.” 81 The Court explained that Smith used the phone and
“voluntarily conveyed” his information to the phone company. 82 As
a result, he “assumed the risk” that his information would be
revealed to police. 83Furthermore, the Court explained that Miller
74. See id. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I wash my hands of today’s
extended redundancy by the Court.”).
75. Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (explaining that a
pen register is a mechanical device that records the telephone numbers dialed
from the petitioner’s home without overhearing the conversations).
79. See id. at 736 (“This case presents the question whether the installation
and use of a pen register constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
80. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
81. Id. at 746.
82. Id. at 744.
83. Id.
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had “no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not
‘legitimate.’” 84 The Court also emphasized that this expectation
was “not one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 85 Finally, the majority opinion stated that these pen
registers “do not acquire contents of communication.” 86
Again, the Court was split. 87 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall dissented. 88 Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan
recognized a principle that would apply to future cell phone
customers, explaining that “it is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in
contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative” to using the technology in question. 89 Recognizing the
prevalence of technology in society in 1979, the dissent stated that
“unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance.” 90
Importantly, Justice Stewart’s dissent suggested that
although the phone numbers dialed from a private line may be
more “prosaic” than the actual phone conversation, they are “not
without content.” 91 Justice Marshall’s dissent noted that, without
a search warrant, innocent people with nothing to hide could be
negatively affected. 92 For example, “[m]any individuals, including
members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with
confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of
their personal contacts.” 93 The dissent explained that to allow:

84. Id. at 745.
85. See id. at 743–46 (explaining that society did not have this expectation
of privacy (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
86. Id. at 741.
87. See id. at 736–52 (demonstrating the divergence of views on this point).
88. Id. at 746–52.
89. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 750 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465–66 (1963)).
91. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 751–52 (warning that government intrusion into personal
information without a probable cause warrant may raise significant and
unintended Fourth Amendment concerns).
93. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972)).
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[G]overnmental access to telephone records on less than
probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a
truly free society. Particularly given the Government’s previous
reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace
reporters’ sources and monitor protected political activity, I
[Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan] am unwilling to
insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial review. 94

Because these privacy interests are significant, the dissent argued
that law enforcement should be “require[d]” to obtain a warrant
before seeking customers’ information from the telephone
companies . 95
B. Fourth Amendment Privacy Issues and Modern Technology
These two cases from the 1970’s, Miller and Smith, 96 helped
create the framework for Fourth Amendment privacy analysis that
courts still apply today. 97 While the legal analysis has not changed,
technology has. As modern cell phones and other technologies have
evolved, lower courts have struggled with the application of the
third-party doctrine and the Supreme Court has generally “stayed
out” of modern electronic surveillance. 98 Noting this dichotomy
between the older legal doctrine and modern technology, the
Supreme Court has issued several recent decisions that suggest a
“new way forward.” 99
1. GPS in United States v. Jones
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court signaled that courts
may need guidance in applying the third-party doctrine to new
94. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979).
97. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1181 (discussing the current
technologies available when the third-party doctrine originated).
98. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communication Privacy, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007).
99. See Price, supra note 26, at 247 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)).
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technology, especially with regard to society’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. 100 In United States v. Jones, 101 government
officials obtained a warrant to install a GPS tracking device under
the defendant’s car within ten days inside of the District of
Columbia. Eleven days after the issuance of the warrant, officers
installed the GPS device on Jones’ car while in a parking lot in
Maryland. 102 Law enforcement tracked “the vehicle’s movements
for 28 days.” 103 The Court unanimously held, with two
concurrences, that the tracking was an unlawful trespass and
constituted a prohibited Fourth Amendment search. 104
While Jones did not involve a third-party dispute such as those
in Miller and Smith, 105 the two concurrences in Jones offer
significant insights into possible ways of modernizing the thirdparty doctrine. 106 In her concurrence, believing that trespass could
serve as a floor instead of a ceiling for privacy interests, Justice
Sotomayor backed Justice Scalia and asserted that the Jones case
demonstrated the need to consider society’s reasonable expectation
of privacy in the government’s use of location-based tracking
technology. 107 Justice Sotomayor stated that a “Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.” 108 She warned that “[w]ith increasing regularity, the
government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring
100. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 948 (“On the 11th day, and not in the District of Columbia but
in Maryland, agents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the
Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot.”).
103. Id. at 946.
104. See id. at 947 (discussing the history of Fourth Amendment violations
and emphasizing the trespass doctrine).
105. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that a phone
company’s use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed from the suspect’s
home upon police request did not constitute a “search” requiring a warrant under
the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(expressing the view that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the acquisition of
information provided to a third-party by subpoena).
106. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the privacy implications associated with Fourth
Amendment searches).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 954–55.
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undertaken in this case by enlisting factory or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.” 109
Knowledge of such GPS tracking “chills associational and
expressive freedoms.” 110
While Justice Sotomayor’s statements are arguably dicta, her
recognition of the speed with which technology is changing and
society’s increasing expectations of privacy are directly relevant to
the need for an updated analysis of the third-party doctrine in the
context of obtaining cell phone location data. 111 While Jones was
not a per se third-party doctrine case, Justice Sotomayor’s fivepage concurrence discussing the need for change to the third-party
doctrine is significant. Her concurrence may mean the Supreme
Court is willing to consider updating the doctrine in the
appropriate case. Justice Sotomayor even seemed to signal that
change could be imminent, writing, “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.” 112
Similarly, Justice Alito filed a concurrence which Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined. 113 Justice
Alito opined that the majority’s opinion was “highly artificial”
because it relies on eighteenth century tort law. 114 Instead, Jones
presented the question of “whether respondent’s reasonable
expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring
of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” 115 Justice Alito accepted
the US v. Knotts 116 decision, which stated that a beeper placed in
a container to track the defendant’s movements was constitutional
because the defendant was traveling on public roads. 117 Justice
109. See id. at 955 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120,
1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 956.
111. Id. at 957.
112. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
113. See id. at 964 (“I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that occurred in
this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id. at 957–58.
116. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
117. See id. at 282 (discussing how traveling on public roads impacts certain
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Alito also noted that monitoring a defendant without a warrant
should be limited. 118 While Jones held that monitoring the
defendant’s movements for four weeks was considered a Fourth
Amendment search, Justice Alito suggested:
The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that
a reasonable person would not have anticipated. Under this
approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. 119

Justice Alito’s approach also suggests that “the Katz test rests
on the assumption that the hypothetical reasonable person has a
well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.” 120 A person
may have “a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.
But technology can change those expectations.” 121 As a result, he
appears to suggest use of a balancing test, developed by the
legislature, which would weigh the public interest against privacy
concerns. 122
In support of his suggestion, Alito notes that after Katz,
instead of leaving the complex issue of wiretapping to the courts,
Congress passed a federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2510. 123 As with wiretapping, GPS tracking technology can also
be intrusive and presents significant privacy concerns. Like cell
phone tracking, GPS tracking can create an accurate and detailed

Fourth Amendment protection analysis).
118. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (explaining the
precision of advanced location tracking technology and arguing that “lengthy
monitoring” of defendant’s movements through GPS technology implicates
Fourth Amendment protections).
119. Id. at 964 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (stating that perhaps the Fourth Amendment protections could
be safeguarded while allowing police to use this advanced technology by balancing
the public safety with the individual’s privacy).
123. See id. at 963 (“After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to
develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject.
Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute . . . since that time,
the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute.”).
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record of a person’s daily activities and impact privacy
expectations:
On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise
record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of
that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are
equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain
the car’s location at any time so that roadside assistance may
be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen. 124

Obtaining tracking information through toll road collection
systems or new car location devices, can “shape the average
person’s expectations” 125 of privacy. Thus, Justice Alito warned
that the use of longer-term tracking “impinges on the expectation
of privacy” 126 in society.
While the Jones Court concluded that the government’s
actions constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court did not
define a bright-line test for determining an appropriate amount of
time a defendant may be monitored without implicating
constitutional protections. 127 Justice Alito’s concurrence, which
stated that only “relatively short-term monitoring” 128 may not
constitute a search, provides guidance for determining if a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred in situations involving the
latest technology. 129
2. Cell Phones in Riley v. California
In the 2014 case of Riley v. California, 130 the Supreme Court
required police to obtain a detailed search warrant specifying
which parts of a cell phone they intended to search. 131 The Court
124. Id. at 963.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 964.
127. See id. at 950 (describing when a citizen’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is violated but not listing a definitive test applicable to this new
technology).
128. Id. at 964.
129. See id. at 963 (stating that lengthy monitoring may conflict with modern
notions of privacy because of the relative ease and breadth of technological
snooping).
130. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
131. See id. at 2478 (discussing the risks associated with allowing police to
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explained that a heightened expectation of privacy was applicable
because of the personalized nature of cell phones. 132 Cell phones
are “minicomputers” because of the amount and detailed
information they contain. 133 Modern cell phones, the Court stated,
“could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions,
maps, or newspapers.” 134 Because cell phones can store and reveal
highly personal information, the Court reasoned that “officers
must generally secure a warrant” before searching the digital
contents of a cell phone, even when a phone is seized incident to an
arrest. 135
Significantly, the Riley Court recognized that smartphones
have the ability to “reconstruct someone’s specific movements
down to the minute, not only around town but also within a
particular building.” 136 While Riley was not a per se third-party
information case, it implicated third-party doctrine concerns.
Specifically, the Court expressed concern about the amount of data
accessible through the device as well as its geo-tracking
capabilities. 137 While the government argued that procedures can
be established to protect citizens from the intrusive nature of these
technologies, the Court emphatically noted that “the Founders did
not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency
protocols.” 138 As a result, the privacy concern helped the Court

obtain certain data without a warrant).
132. See id. at 2479 (articulating that “today [2014] many of the more than
90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record
of nearly every aspect of their lives”).
133. See id. at 2489 (describing that cell phones are like minicomputers
because of their immense storage capacity).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 2485 (explaining that warrants would help protect Fourth
Amendment concerns involved with this highly revealing technology).
136. See id. at 2490 (describing how different technologies can reveal a
significant amount of information).
137. See id. (“Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been.
Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and
can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building.”).
138. Id. at 2491.
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conclude that law enforcement should seek a specified warrant
before obtaining a smartphone user’s personalized information. 139
3. CSLI in United States v. Graham
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones and the Court’s reasoning
in Riley suggest that changes to the third-party doctrine are
necessary and imminent. As technology continues to advance, and
time-specific location information becomes more accurate, courts
are struggling to keep pace. 140
A more recent Fourth Circuit case illustrates the current
disagreement over applying the third-party doctrine. United States
v. Graham 141 involved a report of several armed robberies over the
course of a few weeks. 142 Investigating this report, police stopped
Aaron Graham’s car with passenger Eric Jordon because the car
and defendants matched witness descriptions from a recent
robbery. 143 The police found a gun in the car. Both Graham and
Jordan provided police their cell phone numbers. 144 Police then
sought a court order under the Stored Communication Act (SCA),
which was granted based on “specific and articulable facts” 145
instead of a probable cause warrant. The government wanted to
use the defendants’ cell phone location information to “more
conclusively link the [d]efendants” 146 to the robberies.
139. See id. at 2494–95 (stating that the “answer to the question of what police
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple—get a warrant”).
140. See Silliman, supra note 6 (emphasizing that technology continues to
rapidly advance and courts cannot keep applying old law to current technology).
141. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015)
(illustrating how the third-party doctrine applied in a case with robberies).
142. See id. (stating that this “prosecution arose from a series of six armed
robberies of several business establishments” occurring from January 17, 2011 to
February 5, 2011).
143. See id. at 339–41 (stating that the car and clothing of the defendants
matched witness descriptions of the robbers).
144. See id. at 340 (explaining the factual circumstances in which the
defendants were stopped by police).
145. See id. at 387 (discussing the police procedure and reasons for applying
the court order).
146. See id. at 386 (showing the government’s motive for using the defendants’
cell phone location information).
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Moving to suppress the cell location information evidence, the
defendants did not allege that the SCA is prima facie
unconstitutional, but argued instead that the SCA as applied to
their circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. 147 They
stated that the length of time and extent of monitoring without a
probable cause warrant violated the defendants’ reasonable
expectation of privacy and should be deemed unconstitutional. 148
By use of a court order, without a probable cause warrant, police
were able to collect “two hundred and twenty-one days and
20,235 individual cell site location data points” from the
defendants’ cell phone location data. 149 With this information, the
government was then able to “place [the defendants] in the vicinity
of the armed robberies when the robberies had occurred.” 150
The government argued that “by using their cellular phones,
and thereby voluntarily conveying their approximate location to
their service provider, the Defendants can claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy in that data—in other words, the Fourth
Amendment simply does not apply.” 151 The lower court held that
the defendants’ rights were not violated because the SCA 152
147. See id. at 342 (“Appellants filed a motion to suppress use of the CSLI at
trial, arguing that the government's acquisition of the records without a warrant
based on probable cause was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
148. See id. at 407 (describing the defendants’ challenge that the
government’s use of their CSLI violated their Fourth Amendment protections).
149. Id. at 387.
150. See id. at 424 (showing how the government placed the defendants in the
vicinity of the armed robbery).
151. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (2012) (describing
why the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this case).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1986) (explaining when a court can issue orders
which allow government entities to receive information from cell phone
providers). The statute states:
[A] court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a
court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court
issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly
by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the
information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature
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allowed the government to obtain records from the cell providers
that were kept “in the ordinary course of business.” 153
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit “declined to apply the thirdparty doctrine” and held that the appellants “have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their long-term CSLI.” 154 The Court
“conclude[d] that the government’s procurement and inspection of
Appellants’ historical CSLI was a search, and the government
violated Appellants’ Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in this
search without first securing a judicial warrant based on probable
cause.” 155 Although the Court found a Fourth Amendment
violation, the Court also ruled that the CSLI “records were not
subject to suppression” because the government acted in “good
faith” applying for “court orders issued under the SCA.” 156
Rehearing the case en banc in 2016, the Fourth Circuit applied
the third-party doctrine and held that defendants’ Fourth
Amendment protections were not violated because the
“Government legally acquired those records.” 157 The majority
opinion seemed to invite the Supreme Court or Congress to change
the current third-party doctrine as follows:
The Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate,
the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a
warrant for CSLI cell-site location information. But without a
change in controlling law, we cannot conclude that the
Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case. 158

The Fourth Circuit in Graham went on to state that “Supreme
Court precedent mandates this conclusion.” 159 The Supreme
or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden
on such provider.

Id.
153. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 388–90 (articulating that a Fourth
Amendment violation had not occurred because the information obtained by
police was voluntarily submitted to the third parties and held in the ordinary
course of business).
154. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 360 (4th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s holding on appeal).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 438 (4th Cir., 2016)
(explaining the Fourth Circuit’s holding when rehearing the case en banc).
158. Id. at 425.
159. Id.
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Court’s mandate, however, may not be so clear. As noted in Part II
below, there is disagreement in the lower courts as to the exact
nature of the Supreme Court’s guidance regarding cell phone
tracking technology and the third-party doctrine.
Under the SCA, the government must prove “specific and
articulable facts” 160 instead of probable cause to obtain a cell
phone’s location information. This “specific and articulable facts”
standard has been criticized by scholars for not being a sufficient
standard to protect privacy rights. 161 Demonstrating the need for
clarity, several judges in Graham concurred and dissented. In
Judge Wilkerson’s concurrence, he stated the warrant requirement
should be considered by Congress. 162 Judge Winn dissented and
Judge Floyd and Judge Thacker dissented in part and concurred
in part. Judge Winn expressed the following concern:
A customer buys a cell phone. She turns it on and puts it in her
pocket. With those acts, says the majority, she has “voluntarily
conveyed” an unbounded set of personal location data to her
service provider, all of which is unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. 163

Some scholars claim that the basis for Judge Winn’s statement
is, “[c]ell phone users do not know about the CSLI shared by their
phones, and they take no discrete action in order to convey it (aside
from mere use).” 164 As a result, it appears that the Graham
decision “shows the third-party doctrine’s flaw: in its focus on
categorizing behavior, it does not accurately estimate what society
today would consider reasonable.” 165 Graham needs to be updated
to “reflect our [society’s] complex and changing relationship with
160. See id. at 426 (discussing what the government must prove under the
SCA).
161. See Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell
Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1750–52 (2009) (arguing that courts should be required
to use a probable cause standard instead of a “specific and articulable facts”
standard before allowing either historical or real-time CSLI to be disclosed).
162. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 435, 438–39 (Wilkerson, J., concurring) (stating
Congress is better adept to deal with CSLI privacy concerns).
163. See id. at 441 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (stating that consumers do not
voluntarily convey privacy information when they purchase a phone).
164. See Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1276 (stating the basis for Judge Winn’s
statement).
165. Id. at 1273.
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technology.” 166 Illustrating this need, courts have reached varying
conclusions when applying the third-party doctrine.
II. Into the Bog: Confusion in the Courts
Many courts have applied the third-party doctrine to similar
factual circumstances, but have reached different legal
conclusions. The courts are in a “Serbonian Bog” of confusion. 167
National research conducted by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) displayed on the map below illustrates how
different courts have reached different conclusions and
demonstrates that the precedent is not as established as the
Fourth Circuit stated in Graham. 168 The courts need clear
guidance when addressing the government’s use of CSLI.

166. Id.
167. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(showing how different courts apply the third-party doctrine to similar factual
circumstances).
168. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016)
(illustrating the wide variety of third-party doctrine interpretation).
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Figure 1 169

169. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Lawsby State, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-phone-location-tracking-laws-state (last visited
Nov. 29, 2017) (displaying various applications of the warrant requirement under
the third-party doctrine) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
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A. Distinguishing Between Type of Data and Technology

Courts disagree about whether a warrant is required for realtime CSLI. Scholar Teresa Reed explains “the Florida Supreme
Court ruled in Tracey v. State that the warrantless use of cell site
location information to track an individual during the course of a
single day’s car trip violated the Fourth Amendment.” 170
Displaying the contradictory nature of this doctrine, not all courts
reach the same result. Examining these different conclusions,
scholars David Oscar Markus and Nathan Freed Wessler explain
that in one 2012 Sixth Circuit case, the Court held that “the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to shorter-term real-time tracking of a
cell phone user’s location during a single three-day multi-state trip
on public highways.” 171 Therefore, it is apparent that courts apply
varying analyses to reach these difficult decisions involving
technology and privacy.
Recently, courts have distinguished between the different
types of content. For example, several courts have held that
reading email content qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search
requiring a warrant. 172 The Sixth Circuit has stated that even
though email subscribers voluntarily submit this information to
third-party internet providers, their reasonable expectation of
privacy requires the government to get a warrant before obtaining
this information. 173 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that
obtaining email address information, IP addresses, and email data,
does not qualify as a Fourth Amendment search and does not
require a warrant. 174
170. Teresa Reed, Digital Privacy in the Post-Riley World, Outline, STAN. L.
SCH. 1–11, 2 (2015).
171. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1197 n.90 (“The court reserved
decision about ‘situations where police, using otherwise legal methods, so
comprehensively track a person’s activities that the very comprehensiveness of
the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” (quoting United
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012))).
172. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating
that the privacy interests associated with this technology were violated when the
government compelled the production of emails without first obtaining a warrant
based on probable cause).
173. See id. at 287–88 (describing the difference between content and noncontent privacy concerns with emails).
174. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that Fourth Amendment privacy interests were not violated because the manner
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In United States v. Forrester, 175 in the Ninth Circuit, the Court
noted that “the techniques the government used to monitor the
defendant’s “email and internet activity,” including IP addresses
and amount of data transmitted does violate the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment protections. 176 Differentiating between the
privacy expectations in the use of these different and evolving
modern technologies may be difficult because the third-party
doctrine has remained static. 177
B. Federal Magistrate Discretion
As a result of different courts reaching different conclusions
and attempting to distinguish between technologies, one federal
circuit reasoned that federal magistrate judges should have
discretion to decide whether a warrant is required on a case-bycase basis for CSLI requests. 178 The Third Circuit has stated that
magistrates have the discretion to issue these court orders on a
“lesser” 179 standard than probable cause, but can also “require a
warrant showing probable cause.” 180 The Third Circuit stated that
this power should be used “sparingly.” 181 As a result, courts often
employ the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis which leads
to differing results. 182 As noted, the reasonable expectation of

in which the information was revealed was similar to the use of a pen register).
175. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
176. Id. at 510–13.
177. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of The Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2011) (emphasizing that Fourth Amendment issues
continue to confuse courts as technology develops).
178. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1198 (discussing the various
approaches different circuits use when evaluating the constitutionality of CSLI
searches (citing In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010))).
179. In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010).
180. Id. at 318.
181. Id.
182. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1202 (arguing that more courts
should use the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis when determining if the
Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a search warrant before
obtaining a consumer’s cell-site location).
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privacy analysis has created confusion and disagreement among
the circuits.
C. Different Reasoning; Similar Results
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 183 and Eleventh Circuits have
upheld the government’s collection of defendant’s CSLI without a
warrant. 184 Even when circuits reach the same conclusion, they
often offer significantly different justifications. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant “voluntarily” submits her
location information to the cellular service provider, therefore
allowing police to obtain it from the cellular company without a
warrant. 185 While the Eleventh Circuit agrees to the extent that
police do not need a probable cause warrant to collect this location
information, that Court has held that this information is not
voluntarily conveyed. 186
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Skinner 187 and in United
States v. Carpenter 188 opined that law enforcement does not violate
Fourth Amendment protections when obtaining CSLI without a
probable cause warrant. 189 Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit
183. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010)
(suggesting that this holding may be unstable in the Sixth Circuit).
184. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1782–83 (discussing how courts have
analyzed the third-party doctrine (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d
880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.
2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); In re Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013); In re United States for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304,
313 (3d Cir. 2010))).
185. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1798–99 (evaluating different reasons for
upholding the third-party doctrine (citing In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013))).
186. Id. at 1798 (clarifying the different conclusion reached by the Eleventh
Circuit (citing United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015))).
187. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
188. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
189. See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774 (stating that the Constitution does not
provide protections for the defendant’s “erroneous expectations” of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment associated with modern technology); see also id. at 887–
88 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the CSLI collected by the cellular carrier in
this case is “unprotected” by the Fourth Amendment).
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recently stated in United States v. Davis 190 that because the
government is required under the SCA to prove specific and
articulable facts before a court order is issued, any expectation of
privacy the defendant may have regarding his CSLI is “not
justifiable.” 191 Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit explained as follows:
Cell users know that they must transmit signals to cell towers
within range, that the cell tower functions as the equipment
that connects the calls, that users when making or receiving
calls are necessarily conveying or exposing to their service
provider their general location within that cell tower’s range,
and that cell phone companies make records of cell-tower
usage. 192

Adopting a different standard than the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit has taken the position that the courts do not have
“discretion” to deny the government a court order for CSLI as long
as the government has complied with the “specified and
articulable” facts standard noted in SCA § 2703. 193
Adding to the varying analyses among the circuits, the Third
Circuit has held that law enforcement may obtain CSLI from thirdparty providers, not based on the third-party doctrine, but rather
based on the “public disclosure doctrine.” 194 The public disclosure
doctrine suggests that law enforcement is justified in obtaining
location-based cell phone information because this technology
tracks “voluntary movements that are susceptible to visual
surveillance” similar to those on a public street or highway. 195
Under this doctrine, police are treated as ordinary citizens and
may track the public movements of an individual without violating
190. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
191. Id. at 511.
192. Id.
193. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703; see In re the United States for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating that this standard is the “proper
framework” for evaluating privacy concerns associated with CSLI).
194. See Bedi, supra note 14, at 517 (explaining that the Third Circuit used a
different analysis than other courts, but reached the same conclusion about CSLI
obtained without a probable cause warrant (citing In re Application of the United
States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010))).
195. See id. at 521 (explaining the analysis of and justification for the public
disclosure doctrine).
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Fourth Amendment protections. 196 Some scholars suggest that at
least in one case, if the Third Circuit used the third-party doctrine
instead of the public disclosure analysis, the Court might have
required a warrant to obtain location-based information. 197 The
Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion,
but based their decisions on different doctrines.
D. The Case for a Probable Cause Warrant
Numerous courts reject the Fifth Circuit’s position which
limits judicial discretion. In the Seventh Circuit, a District Court
in Indiana denied the government’s SCA §2703 request for
“location-based services” 198 revealing CSLI information.
Specifically, the Court opined that seeking this information
requires a “probable cause” standard. 199 Contrary to the Fifth
Circuit’s approach, a Seventh Circuit District Court also asserted
that CSLI information the government requested was
“unobtainable absent a warrant.” 200
Patrick Chamberlain examined a 2008 Western District of
Pennsylvania case which held that probable cause is the proper
standard when determining whether to allow the government to
view customers’ cell site location information. 201 In 2014, the First
Circuit of Massachusetts Court concluded that suspects have an
objective expectation of privacy in their CSLI and therefore, police
should be required to obtain a warrant before gathering this
196. See id. at 521–22 (analyzing how the public disclosure doctrine relates to
the third-party doctrine and Fourth Amendment concerns with modern
technology).
197. See id. at 517 (suggesting that the Third Circuit would have reached a
different conclusion if it did not focus on the public disclosure doctrine (citing In
re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010))).
198. In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of
a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, at 3 (N.D.
Ind. 2006).
199. Id. at 13–14.
200. Id. at 3–4.
201. See Chamberlain, supra note 161, at 1750 (explaining that the District
Court rejected the more general “specific and articulable facts” standard (citing
In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2008))).
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potentially incriminating and revealing information. 202 While the
defendant’s motion to suppress CSLI evidence was eventually
vacated, one Judge opined that “[a] person obtains a cellular
telephone for the purpose of making and receiving telephone calls,
not to permit the telephone company or another third-party to
track the user’s location when the person is not using the
telephone.” 203
III. Out of the Bog; Proposed Solutions
The proposed solutions to the problem of how to modernize
the third-party doctrine span “the ideological spectrum.” 204 This
Note proposes that the Fourth Amendment requires the
government to obtain a probable cause warrant to acquire CSLI
data. 205
A. Third-Party Search Exception
Akhil Amar (Amar) suggests that the Fourth Amendment and
Warrant Clauses are separate and should not be read together. 206
Lucas Issacharoff (Issacharoff) and Kyle Wirshba (Wirshba)
explain that using Amar’s approach, another way to reexamine the
202. See generally Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014)
(granting defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress CSLI evidence), rev’d,
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 868 (Mass. 2014) (vacating
defendant’s motion to suppress).
203. See Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 872 (Gants, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
third-party doctrine should apply to telephone toll records as well as CSLI).
204. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 997 (2016).
205. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2–70.3 (2015) (requiring the government to
obtain a warrant to collect real-time CSLI tracking from third-parties under
Virginia law). While this statute provides law enforcement possible guidance for
the third-party doctrine, to provide consistent Fourth Amendment privacy
protections the government should also be required to obtain a warrant before
collecting historical CSLI.
206. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 761 (1994) (stating that the words of the Fourth Amendment and the
Warrant Clause “do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and
seizures. They do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures without
warrants”).
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third-party doctrine would be to rely on “a single inquiry into
reasonableness.” 207 The Fourth Amendment analysis under this
proposition focuses on whether the law enforcement tactics were
reasonable, and places less emphasis on the warrant and probable
cause aspect of the analysis. 208 As Issacharoff and Wirshba admit,
courts and scholars suggest that focusing only on reasonableness
would too often create “an occasion for constitutional review.” 209
As a result, Issacharoff and Wirshba claim that “third-party
searches are better characterized as a new type of warrant
exception than as either a search subject to the warrant and
probable cause requirements or a non-search unregulated by the
Fourth Amendment.” 210 Accordingly, they propose that courts
should “recognize third party searches as another exception to the
warrant requirement, and accordingly craft a reasonableness test
to gauge when third party searches are constitutionally
appropriate.” 211 Arguing that in third-party doctrine cases a
probable cause requirement “should not attach by default,” these
scholars opine that “the constitutional imposition of a warrant
requirement would both overprotect information in which
individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy and unduly
hamper law enforcement interests.” 212 Rather, third party
searches should be governed by, but not solely reliant on, the
Reasonableness Clause.
Discussing reasonableness, Issacharoff and Wirshba appear to
disagree with Amar’s focus on the “kitchen sink reasonableness
inquiry in every case.” 213 Rather Issacharoff and Wirshba argue
that courts should adopt Chief Justice Warren’s approach in Terry
207. Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1009.
208. See id. at 1009 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have seen, is
neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.” (quoting Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802 (1994))).
209. See id. at 1011 (arguing that reliance on this factor would “conver[t] the
fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot” (citing Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393 (1974))).
210. Id. at 986.
211. Id. at 1012.
212. Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1012.
213. Id. at 1029 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761 (1994)).
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v. Ohio 214 as a model for third-party doctrinal analysis. Terry
involved a law enforcement officer stopping and frisking a
citizen. 215 The Court balanced the government’s interest against
the individual’s interest. 216 Considering the validity of a stop and
frisk, the new test the Court considered asked “whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted
in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” 217 In
Terry, this reasonably prudent man was the law enforcement
officer. 218
Attempting to create a single test that law enforcement could
apply in the field and courts could easily adopt, the Terry Court did
not initially focus its analysis on the specific facts of the case.
Instead, it created a “general proposition” of balancing the risks
associated with the search. 219
Because some scholars argue that citizens have a diminished
expectation of privacy with modern technology, courts considering
the third-party doctrine should focus on law enforcement’s
reasonableness in conducting the search. As a result, instead of
examining “total quantity of information” or “types of third party
information,” it is suggested that under this Terry approach courts
should “take a step back and conduct a one-time balancing of the
reasonableness of government access to third party material ‘as a
general proposition.’” 220
Under this framework, it is suggested that “[t]he Terry Court’s
move from a case-by-case balancing to a uniform standard can be
used to create an equally administrable standard for third party
materials.” 221 This reasonable suspicion test for third party

214. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174–76 (1949); Stacey v. Emery,
97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)).
215. Id. at 1872–73.
216. Id. at 1879.
217. Id. at 1883.
218. See id. (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”).
219. Id. at 1879 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. 387, U.S. 523, 534–35) (1967)).
220. Id. at 1034.
221. Id. at 1033.
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searches, some scholars argue, is a practical middle ground. 222
Similar to Terry, in third party situations, “officers should be able
to point to specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that the third party search will turn up information
relevant to an ongoing investigation, and searches should be
reasonable in scope.” 223 While opponents of a warrant requirement
argue that consumers lack an expectation of privacy in the
information submitted to their cellular provider, 224 even
proponents of this theory admit that the expectation of privacy is
not totally diminished. 225
Many judges and scholars agree that cell phone consumers
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. As Justice Marshall and
Justice Brennan have noted, if there is no practical real alternative
to an action, the action should not be considered voluntary. 226
Richard Epstein (Epstein) states that this diminished expectation
of privacy is not assumed. 227 Epstein argues that the Fourth
Amendment should require a balancing of interests to determine
the reasonableness of the privacy component of a particular case.
He explains that:
In essence the task is finding that set of rules which, when laid
down generally, produces the best mix of privacy and security that
can be obtained in light of the limited available knowledge, taking
into account that the Fourth Amendment protects not only the
guilty, but also innocent persons who may have been swept into a
search. 228
Responding to Epstein’s assertion of a cost-benefit test for
advanced technologies, Orin Kerr (Kerr) suggests that this
222. Id. at 1030–31.
223. Id. at 1036.
224. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1789 (articulating the argument that
customers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy to this information).
225. See Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1021 (explaining that this
expectation of privacy is “diminished, though not nonexistent”).
226. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Brennan, J., &
Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that consumers do not voluntarily convey this
privacy information).
227. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Privacy the Third Hand: Lessons from
the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 1199 (2009)
(discussing the assumption of the risk with CSLI is forced on individuals).
228. Id. at 1202.
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balancing approach has already been used by courts. 229
Furthermore, Kerr states that Epstein’s argument significantly
differs from his because Epstein does not subscribe to an “all or
nothing” 230 approach to the Fourth Amendment. Kerr believes that
police action either is or is not a search. 231 If it is a search, then it
requires a probable cause warrant. 232
Kerr defends the advantages of the third-party doctrine which
consist of “technological neutrality of Fourth Amendment rules” 233
and provides “ex ante clarity.” 234 While Kerr disagrees with many
scholars’ arguments, he recognizes that many authors and courts
suggest that a significant change to the third-party doctrine is
necessary. Kerr explains that the third-party doctrine inquiry
should be a fact specific determination of whether the person acted
reasonably and had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 235 He
explains that “[t]his is a prospective inquiry from the standpoint of
the suspect: The question is whether a reasonable person in the
suspect’s situation would expect the information to be widely
disseminated.” 236
Given Kerr’s argument about reasonableness, Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Jones is significant. Justice Alito stated that
advancing technology may change society’s expectations of
privacy. 237 If there is no realistic alternative to using a technology,
and a particular technology is necessary to function in modern
society, then Justice Alito is correct that this information is not
“voluntarily” disclosed to third parties. Suggesting that society has
229. See Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to
Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 1229, 1230 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr,
Defending] (discussing the balancing analysis many courts already use).
230. Id. at 1232.
231. Id. (articulating his all-or-nothing standard to Fourth Amendment law).
232. See id. (discussing the general implications of a police search).
233. Id. at 1231 (stating that balancing the interests of a prisoner’s privacy in
her cell and society’s interest, the interests of society outweigh the prisoner’s
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984))).
234. Id.
235. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 583 (2009) (evaluating alternatives to replace the third-party doctrine).
236. Id.
237. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating that society’s reasonable expectation of privacy may change
with modern location tracking technology).
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already recognized a heightened expectation of privacy because of
the pervasive use of technology, many scholars suggest that society
may already have an objective expectation of privacy for location
emitting devices, such as cell phones. 238 If society has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, then perhaps a more persuasive
modification to the third-party doctrine is to require a probable
cause warrant for CSLI.
B. Probable Cause Requirement for Third-Party Searches
Many scholars argue that the pervasive use and ubiquitous
existence of current technologies mandate more protection than a
court order based on specific and articulable facts. Scholars
Priscilla J. Smith, Nabiha Syed, David Thaw, and Albert Wong
suggest the following:
[The] type and scope of information collected by prolonged
automated GPS surveillance enables governments to monitor a
person’s political associations, their medical conditions and
their amorous interests, in a way that invades their privacy and
chills expression of other fundamental rights. 239

As a result of the nature of this technology, law enforcement
should be required to obtain warrants “to prevent abuse” of Fourth
Amendment privacy protections. 240 Without a warrant, prolonged
GPS surveillance disturbs society’s reasonable expectation of
privacy and “chills the exercise of core constitutional rights.” 241
These scholars argue that the continuous monitoring of GPS
information presents a different question than the Court’s
238. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their personal cell phones because of the amount of personal information they
contain).
239. Priscilla Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless
Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right
Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter When
Machines Are Watching] http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1001&context=ylas (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
240. Id. at 220–21.
241. Id. at 221.
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precedent of Knotts 242 which involved beeper technology. 243 GPS
technology not only continuously provides location information,
but unlike previous beeper technology, it does not require officers
to follow the suspect. 244 Furthermore, GPS is more intrusive
because these devices can “store” location information and
transmit this information to a variety of parties, revealing common
patterns, preferences, and more intrusive information than a
traditional beeper. 245
Additionally, as the Court noted in Kyllo, 246 a significant factor
for Courts to consider is whether the technology is in “general
public use.” 247 While GPS technology is embedded in all
smartphones today, the use of “GPS surveillance technology,
however, is not accepted by the public.” " 248 Because cell phones
may have the capacity to track an individual’s movements down to
a few feet, 249 it seems credible that this surveillance location
information infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy. Some
scholars argue that, “[i]n fact, Americans become uncomfortable
with GPS when there is even a slight loss of user-control.” 250
While there are many proposed iterations of the third-party
doctrine, there is one consistent, overriding factor: with the
242. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
243. See id. (discussing the relationship between beeper technology and
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns”).
244. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 21.
245. Id. at 23.
246. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
247. Id. at 34.
248. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 24.
249. See Jonathan Rodriguez, Uptick in Police Surveillance Tech Sparks New
Opportunity, WALL ST. DAILY (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.wallstreetdaily.com
/2017/02/16/uptick-police-surveillance-tech-sparks-new-opportunity/ (discussing
the recent trend of and accuracy associated with the government using cell phone
location tracking technology) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice); see also Robinson Meyer, How the Government Surveils
Cellphones: A Primer, ATLANTIC (Sep. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2015/09/how-the-government-surveils-cell-phones-aprimer/404818/ (explaining the precision of different CSLI technologies the
government uses) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
250. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 24, 24 n.35 (stating
that “GPS technology is also used by some private and government employers to
ensure job performance and service delivery”).
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amount of tracking information that a smartphone can capture,
hold, and reveal, people in modern society have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this information. This expectation should
require a higher and clearer standard than specific and articulable
facts before such detailed personal information is turned over to
law enforcement. As some argue, if there is not a warrant
requirement, there is an “unprecedented” potential for abuse of
privacy protections. 251 Recently, legislation has been introduced in
Congress to address the issue of government searches of cell phone
location information.
C. Legislative Solution
As several courts have suggested, given how quickly
technology changes, the legislature may be in the best position to
modernize the third-party doctrine. In Riley, Justice Alito
suggested that perhaps Congress or state legislatures should
balance the law enforcement interests and citizens’ Constitutional
protections to “enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions
based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.” 252
Justice Alito also emphasized that the “legislatures, elected by the
people, are in a better position than we are to assess and respond
to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost
certainly will take place in the future” about this constantly
evolving technology. 253
Legislation addressing Fourth Amendment privacy concerns
in government searches of location-based technology was reintroduced in January 2015 by Congressman Jason Chaffetz (R)
from Utah and Senator Ron Wyden (D) from Oregon. 254 This bipartisan support for legislation is titled the Geo-location Privacy
and Surveillance Act (GPS Act). 255 It seeks to require a consumer’s
express consent before location information may be revealed. 256
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
person

Id. at 26.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2497–98.
H.R. 491, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 237, 114th Cong. (2015).
Id.
See id. § 2602(d)(1) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a
to intercept geolocation information pertaining to another person if such
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Notably, there are several exceptions to the consent requirement,
including theft or fraud, emergency situations, and most notably,
a warrant exception. 257 The GPS Act states that, “[a] governmental
entity may intercept geolocation information or require the
disclosure by a provider of a covered service of geo-location
information only pursuant to a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”
or in the “or the Foreign Intelligence 12 Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)” 258 The Act is structured in the same
manner as the federal wiretapping statue and is intended to be
applied in a similar manner. 259
IV. Conclusion
Technology has advanced to the point where cell phone
tracking can sometimes locate a phone’s precise location within
several feet. 260 Most consumers would probably be shocked to learn
that, pursuant to the third-party doctrine, cell phone carriers can
legally turn over CSLI to law enforcement without a probable
cause warrant. The concept that consumers somehow voluntarily
consent to the disclosure of such highly detailed personal
information when they sign up for cell phone service defies the
reality of modern society. Citizens’ reasonable Fourth Amendment
privacy expectations in the use of cell phones should be protected.
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, the Court’s decision in
Riley, and the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Graham, offer
an opportunity to pursue Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it is
time to reconsider the third-party doctrine. Using Jones and Riley,
the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to clarify the
other person has given prior consent to such interception.”).
257. See generally id. § 2602(d)–(h) (listing the various exceptions to the
requirement of disclosing information).
258. See id. § 2602(2) (describing the warrant requirements associated with
this piece of legislation).
259. See Geolocation Privacy Legislation, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/policy/
legislation/gps-act/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2016) (describing the legislative history
and procedure for this Act) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
260. Rodriguez, supra note 249.
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confusion created by the application of outdated laws to modern
technology. 261
All the Justices’ positions in Jones suggest that a warrant is
preferable. A probable cause warrant requirement for CSLI would
allow the courts to keep up with constantly evolving cell phone
tracking technology. Analogous to the impact of the Miranda
warning requirement, requiring a warrant for CSLI would remove
the legal confusion in this area. Such a requirement would also
assist law enforcement and ensure citizens’ reasonable
expectations of privacy.
The Riley decision is especially helpful in analyzing privacy
issues that arise from the use of cell phones. Riley, a unanimous
decision, specifically addressed what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest. 262 The United
States Supreme Court should extend its analysis in Riley to the
government’s collection of data created by the use of a cell phone.
The path out of the Bog is clear: “get a warrant.” 263
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